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Abstract: The New Business Tax System (Debt and Equity) Act established a set of
criteria by which convertible securities could be classified as “debt-like” or
“equity-like” for tax purposes. Using data on 256 convertible issues made in
Australia between 2001 and 2012, we show that there is a strong relation
between, on the one hand, a convertible’s ex ante classification determined at
issuance using the tax criteria and, on the other hand, its ex post classification
based on the conversion premium at maturity. We conclude that the criteria
have been an efficient means of classifying convertibles. We also find an
industry effect where debt-like convertibles are more likely to be associated
with the resources, metals and mining firms, whilst equity-like are mainly issued
by the finance sector. This finding is consistent with the solution to a finance-
sequencing problem in the former case, and the impact of capital adequacy
regulation in the latter.
Keywords: tax classification, convertible securities, misclassification
1 Introduction
Many jurisdictions have attempted to define a mutually exclusive basis on which
to classify convertible securities as either debt-like or equity-like for the pur-
poses of taxation and/or the preparation of financial statements. In 2001, new
legislation was enacted in Australia which specified a detailed set of tests to
classify individual issues of convertible securities as being either “debt-like” or
“equity-like” for taxation purposes. In this paper, we examine empirically the
ability of this system to distinguish between those issues that most resemble
debt and those that most resemble equity. Finally, we also address the
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additional flexibility afforded by convertibles in assisting certain industries to
structure their funding optimally between debt and equity.
Typically, attempts to classify convertibles have favoured economic sub-
stance over legal form (Wood, 1999; Orow, 2003). From a tax perspective, the
intention has generally been that every taxpayer should be bound by the
financial reality of their transactions − that is, by the economic substance of
the transactions − rather than by their legal form (Marston, 2006). Courts have
regularly invoked this doctrine in cases where taxpayers have entered into
“artificial” schemes designed to exploit taxation advantages. Examples of such
advantages include claiming expenses as tax deductible in circumstances where
a deduction is not justified by the economic substance of the transaction, and
deferring assessable income to a later date (Mackenzie, 2006). Where the eco-
nomic substance and legal form of a transaction have conflicted, courts have
been willing to override the legal form and deny the taxpayer the intended tax
benefits. Such a decision is, of course, possible only if the court is able to
identify the economic substance. This phenomenon is even more relevant in
Australia, where there is a large concentration of resource and banking firms,
with different capital structure requirements.
An important reason to prefer substance over form is that the application of
this principle leads to a more efficient tax system. Greater efficiency is achieved
by establishing a tax-neutral system (Orow, 2001b), a hallmark of which is that
similar economic circumstances should receive similar tax treatments. In the
case of convertible securities, the implication is that where the economic sub-
stance of a security is equity-like (debt-like), it should receive equity-like (debt-
like) tax treatment.
Canada and the US have adopted different approaches to this classification
issue. In Canada, the government sought in 1997 to minimize tax arbitrage using
preference shares by introducing new rules detailing the characteristics required
for a security to qualify as a preference share (Edgar, 2000). In the US, a “facts
and circumstance” approach has been adopted, in which each security’s classi-
fication is based on its own economic substance on a case-by-case basis. This
approach entails the tax authorities taking taxpayers to court, and arguing that
the principle of substance over form has been breached. An advantage of such
an approach is that it gives the courts flexibility in dealing with innovative
instruments as they mutate and evolve. A disadvantage is that court rulings may
be inconsistent and at times ambiguous (Bourke, 2004).
Australia also has tackled the classification of convertible securities. By the
late 1990s, the convertible market in Australia consisted mainly of income secu-
rities, which are issued in perpetuity and for which all dividend payments are tax
deductible. In 1999 alone, income securities worth $5.64b were issued across
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different sectors, mainly resource and banking firms. These securities were classi-
fied as equity for financial reporting purposes and as debt for tax purposes
(Mackenzie, 2006). Hence, by issuing income securities, firms were able to report
lower leverage but concurrently benefit from the tax deductibility of debt.
Resource and mining firms were acquiring funding represented as equity and
banking firms were raising liabilities satisfying their prudential capital require-
ments, with most securities in either case attracting a tax deduction. This incon-
sistency caught the Treasury’s attention. The Ralph Review recommended a series
of measures and subsequently the New Business Tax System (Debt and Equity) Bill
2001 was enacted.1 The new approach included a detailed set of tests to be applied
to a convertible security at the time of issue to classify the security as either debt-
like or equity-like. The security then maintains this classification regardless of
subsequent events. Orow (2001a), Bourke (2004), and D’Ascenzo (2010) assert that
the legislation results in a consistent and unambiguous framework for classifying
convertibles. Abbey (2002), and Mackenzie (2006) disagree with such a claim but
do not present empirical evidence.
The immediate impact of the new tax rules saw the demise of income
securities, only to be replaced by more complex convertible financial instru-
ments, including StEPS,2 CARS,3 SAINTS,4 POWERS5 and FLIERS,6 all of which
are currently traded on the Australian Securities Exchange. It is now more than a
decade since the new legislation was enacted and it is timely to assess empiri-
cally its ability to classify convertibles according to their economic substance.
Furthermore, more resource and mining firms have sought funding through
issuing convertible securities to satisfy their capital expenditure requirements.
Whereas, the banking sector has also been active in issuing convertibles within
the confines of their capital prudential obligations.
We study a sample of 256 convertible securities issued in Australia between 1
July 2001 and 31 December 2012. We examine the efficiency of the 2001 tax rules by
investigating the association between, on the one hand, the classification allocated
at the time of issue and, on the other hand, the classification of the security on its
maturity date. We refer to these as the security’s ex ante and ex post classifications.
Of the 155 issues classified ex ante as debt-like, 150 (97%) subsequently
1 The Bills Digest No. 68 2001–02 may be downloaded from: http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/
library/pubs/bd/2001-02/02bd068.pdf
2 Stapled exchangeable preferred securities.
3 Convertible adjustable rate securities
4 Subordinated adjustable income non-refundable Tier 1 securities
5 Preferred to ordinary with exchange and reset securities.
6 Floating IPO exchangeable reset securities.
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maintained this classification ex post; of the 101 issues classified ex ante as equity-
like, 82 (81%) maintained this classification ex post. The significance of these
results is confirmed using a chi-square test. We conclude that, overall, the classi-
fication allocated to the securities at issuance is systematically and reliably related
to their economic substance, as validated by their ex post classification. We also
find evidence of an industry factor playing a key role in security selection. Firms in
the resource, metals and mining industries are more likely to issue debt-like
convertibles, whilst banks are more likely to issue equity-like convertibles.
The rest of the paper consists of the following: Section 2 presents the
development of our hypotheses; Section 3 describes our data; Section 4 reports
our results; and Section 5 concludes the study.
2 Development of hypotheses
Convertibles are typically regarded as hybrids of debt and equity. Depending on
the details of the security’s design, a convertible may fall anywhere on a
continuum from almost pure equity to almost pure debt. However, both the
determination of tax liability and the determination of accounting treatment
generally require that a convertible be classified as either debt-like or equity-
like. Typically, the objective has been to classify convertibles according to their
“economic substance”; that is, according to the objective facts of their design,
rather than their legal form.
Given that Australian firms are more inclined to be industry concentrated
within the resource and banking sector, in 2001 legislation was enacted provid-
ing a detailed set of tests to decide whether a convertible security should be
classified as “debt-like” or “equity-like” for tax purposes. These tests involve
features such as the term of the security, whether the issuer’s obligations are
contingent on firm performance and whether the return is substantially more
likely to be positive rather than negative. A schematic overview of the classifica-
tion system included in the legislation is provided in Appendices A and B.
The tests are applied at the time a convertible security is issued, and are
intended to capture its economic substance. To determine whether these tests in
fact classify according to economic substance, we require an objective, quanti-
tative measure of a convertible’s “economic substance”. Following Sarkar
(2003), Kleidt (2005), Veld, Longarski and Horst (2006) and Veld and
Zabolotnyuk, (2009), we use the conversion premium for this purpose. The
conversion premium (CP) is:
CP =CV − FV [1]
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where
CV is the conversion value, which is defined as the product of the security’s
conversion ratio and the current stock price and
FV is the face value of the security.
The logic underlying this measure is that a convertible classified as debt-like
(equity-like) should be less (more) likely to have negative (positive) conversion
premiums. This logic does not preclude the possibility that a convertible’s ex
ante classification will not match its ex post classification. A convertible could
be “correctly” classified ex ante as debt-like (equity-like) yet be classified ex post
as equity-like (debt-like). The logic does, however, imply that over a sufficiently
long time period7 there should be a strong association between a security’s ex
ante and ex post classifications. Hence, our central hypothesis is:
H1: There should be a strong association between convertibles’ ex ante and ex post
classifications as debt-like and equity-like.
Carlin and Finch (2005) and Suchard and Singh (2006) argue that the
Australian convertible market is industry-specific in that firms in different
industries have different motivations for issuing convertibles. Mayers (1998)
suggests that firms facing a sequence of potential financing requirements
would find that issuing debt-like convertibles is a cost-effective solution. Debt-
like convertibles economise on issue costs, while controlling the overinvestment
problem. If the investment option turns out to be in-the-money, the convertible
bonds will be converted to equity, leaving funds within the firm for new invest-
ments and thus saving on subsequent issue costs. Conversely, if the investment
option turns out to be out-of-the-money, no conversion occurs, and funds are
returned to bondholders through redemption. Resource, metals and mining
firms are typical cases of firms with sequential financing needs, because further
development of a mine is needed only if the mineral extract proves profitable.
Therefore, we predict that firms operating in the resource, metals and mining
industry will have a higher propensity to issue debt-like convertibles than other
firms. Hence, we test the following hypothesis:
H2A: Debt-like convertibles are more likely to be issued by resource, metals and
mining firms than by other firms.
7 While there is, of course, no precise definition of “sufficiently long”, reliability is increased if
the sample period includes periods of stable, rising and falling stock prices.
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Banks are in a very different position. Regulations governing the capital
requirements of banks provide a motivation for banks to seek Tier 1 (equity-like)
regulatory capital (Resende, Dib and Perevalov, 2010; Roger and Vlcek, 2011).
Hence, we predict that firms operating in the finance industry are likely to find
attractive the issuance of equity-like convertibles, so that, after the maturity
date, the capital is retained as straight equity. Hence, our final hypothesis is:
H2B: Equity-like convertibles are more likely to be issued by financial firms than by
other firms.
3 Data
The initial sample consisted of all convertible securities issued in Australia
between 1 July 2001 and 31 December 2012. The year 2001 is chosen as the
start date since it is the year when the new classification rules came into effect.
In the first four years of our sample period, stock prices in Australia were
reasonably stable, with the S&P/ASX 200 index averaging about 3,000 points
over the period from 2000 to 2004. A strong price increase followed, with the
index reaching a peak of about 7,000 in October 2007, after which there was a
downward trend in prices throughout 2008 and into 2012. Hence, we have a mix
of stable, bullish and bearish markets throughout our sample.
Between 2001 and 2012, 301 issues of convertible securities were made.
Information8 regarding each of these securities was downloaded from the
Thomson Reuters database Connect 4, particularly the “New Issue” module.
This consists of each firm’s official document sent to the ASX, describing the
security’s characteristics. Datastream was used to find the security’s market
price on conversion/maturity. From this initial sample, we excluded 32 securities
which had not matured at the time of data collection, 7 securities for which
information was missing and 6 securities which were mandatory convertibles.
The last group was excluded because we considered these securities to be
virtually indistinguishable from straight equity. The final sample consists of
256 convertible securities, of which 155 are classified ex ante as debt-like and
101 as equity-like. We modelled the security classifications on the tax provisions,
particularly on Subdivision 974-B and 974-C of the ITAA 1997. Appendices 1 and
2 provide a schematic representation of the classification tests. Since some
8 Security information includes the dollar value of the issue, conversion ratio, face value,
maturity, redeemable by issuer/investor or both and cost in terms of coupon or dividend.
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provisions may require a subjective judgement, we validate our security classi-
fication with the firm’s ability to attach franking credits. Hence, all convertibles
classified as equity-like (debt-like) may (may not) attach franking credits.
Descriptive statistics of the final sample are provided in Table 1.
Issue size varies enormously, ranging from as little as $100,000 to as much
as $750 million. Many of the larger issues were made by banks. At 5.67 years, the
average maturity corresponds to that a medium-term security.
4 Results
The main results are shown in Table 2.
Only 5 of the 155 issues (3.2%) that were initially classified as debt-like were
subsequently classified as equity-like, while only 19 of the 101 issues (18.8%)
Table 2: The association between classification at issuance and subsequent
conversion premium.
The table reports the association between the ex ante and ex post classifications. The
ex ante classification is determined at issuance using the criteria legislated in 2001.
The ex post classification is determined by the sign of the conversion premium:
positive (negative) indicates equity-like (debt-like). The conversion premium is the
conversion value minus the face value of the convertible.
Ex ante Classification Ex post Classification Total
Debt-like Equity-like
Debt-like   
Equity-like   
Total   
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample.
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of 256 convertible security
issues for the following variables: COST, providing a return in the form of fixed periodic
payments, generally on a semi-annual basis; ISSUE, the dollar value of the issue; MAT,
the number of years the time from the issue date to maturity/conversion. The data
period is 1 July 2001 to 31 December 2012.
MIN MAX MEAN MEDIAN SD
COST (%) . . . . .
ISSUE ($ m) .  . . .
MAT (Yrs) . . . . .
Note: MIN, minimum; MAX, maximum; SD, standard deviation.
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that were initially classified as equity-like were subsequently classified as debt-
like. That is, overall, 232 of the 256 issues (90.6%) maintained their ex ante
classification. The chi-square statistic is 165.67, indicating statistical significance
at the 1% level. The evidence therefore gives strong support to our first hypoth-
esis and we conclude that the 2001 Australian classification system is able to
classify convertible issues with a high degree of reliability.
Our second hypothesis is that debt-like convertibles will be associated with
the resource, metals and mining industry, while equity-like convertibles will be
associated with the finance industry. To test this hypothesis, in Table 3we
classify the securities into debt-like and equity-like, using both the ex ante
and ex post classifications.
Using the classifications at issuance (Panel A), it is clear that debt-like conver-
tible issues are associated with the resource, metals and mining firms, while
equity-like issues are associated with financial firms. The chi-square statistic for
Panel A is 74.47, which is significant at the 1% level.9 Panel B figures result in a
similar conclusion. Our results therefore provide strong support for our second
hypothesis, which in turn is consistent with the choice of convertible design
being based on the specific needs of different industries.
Table 3: Debt-like and equity-like issues by industry.
The table reports ex ante and ex post classifications by industry.The ex ante classification is
determined at issuance using the criteria legislated in 2001. The ex post classification is
determined by the sign of the conversion premium: positive (negative) indicates equity-like
(debt-like). The conversion premium is the conversion value minus the face value of the
convertible.
Industry Panel A: Panel B:
Ex ante Classification Ex post Classification
Debt-like Equity-like Debt-like Equity-like
Resource, metals and mining    
Finance    
Other*    
Total    
Note: * i. e. Neither resource, metals and mining nor finance.
9 We also performed two 2 × 2 contingency table tests, the first for resources, metals and
mining against the sum of finance firms and “other” and the second for finance firms against
the sum of resources, metals and mining and “other”. In both cases, results were significant at
the 1% level.
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In terms of policy implications, the tax classification criteria legislated in
2001 are generally objective and provide clarity for issuers and investors. Our
empirical findings indicate that the criteria produce classifications at issuance
that generally align with their subsequent classification, suggesting that the
criteria capture the “economic substance” of convertible issues, which in turn
contributes towards achieving the desirable objective of tax neutrality.
Moreover, the industrial pattern of convertible issues is consistent with the
predictions of finance theory, giving further credence to the classification cri-
teria. Hence, we conclude that the tax classification system is working well. It is
also our view that when accounting standard setters, as well as taxation autho-
rities in other jurisdictions, review their current classification rules, they would
do well to look to the Australian tax criteria for useful insights.
5 Conclusion
Using data on 256 convertible issues between 2001 and 2012, we find that the tax
rules introduced in 2001 efficiently classify convertibles in line with their economic
substance. There is a strong association between the ex ante and ex post classifi-
cation of convertibles as debt-like or equity-like. Hence, the new rules are likely to
have reduced distortions in the convertible market and reduced ambiguity. We also
find a distinct industry pattern in the choice between debt-like and equity-like
issues. The resources, metals and mining industry is more likely to issue debt-like
convertibles. This choice is consistent with these issuers facing sequential finan-
cing decisions. The finance industry is more likely to issue equity-like convertibles.
This choice is consistent with a response to the regulatory framework applying to
banks’ capital adequacy. We conclude that the classification criteria are working
well and contributing to the achievement of tax neutrality.
Appendix A: Determination of debt-interests
Appendix A details the principal rules determining whether an interest is debt-
like. The debt test is set out in Subdivision 974-B of the ITAA 1997. For a security
to qualify as debt-like, both a scheme and a financing arrangement are neces-
sary. A scheme is in line with Section 995–1 of the ITAA 1997 and refers to any
arrangement, scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action or course of
conduct, whether unilateral or otherwise. A financing arrangement is specifi-
cally defined and generally relates to those arrangements entered into by the
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issuer to raise finance or to fund another scheme that is a financing arrange-
ment. Furthermore, a financial benefit making up an economic transaction is
required and the benefit must be independent of the firm’s economic perfor-
mance, i. e. the payment of coupons must be made irrespective of the firm’s
economic performance. Moreover, the maturity of debt-like securities must be
less than ten years and redemption/conversion to common stock may be carried
out by either the issuer or investor.
Appendix B: Determination of equity-interests
Appendix B sets out the main rules which determine whether an interest is
equity-like. The equity test is set out in Subdivision 974-C of the ITAA 1997. A
member or a stockholder is defined as an entity holding an interest in the






Is there a scheme? 
Is the scheme a financing arrangement 
of less than 10 years? 
Does the issuing entity receive or will 
receive a financial benefit(s) under the 
scheme? 
Does the issuing entity have an 
effectively non-contingent obligation 
to provide a financial benefit(s) ? 
Is it substantially more likely than not 
that the financial benefit(s) to be 
provided will be at least equal to the 
benefit received? 
The interest is 
treated as debt  
The interest is 
not treated as 
debt  
NO 
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performance of the company − this is clearly an equity-like convertible.
Furthermore, if the issuer only retains discretion in regards to conversion, then
another feature of the equity-like test tax provisions is satisfied. The security
may also be issued in perpetuity. It is conceivable that a security could pass
both tests of debt and equity. The rules stipulate that in such cases the security
is deemed to be a debt interest.
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